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Re-stating Party Development 
in Central and Eastern Europe?
SEÁN HANLEY*
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London
After the collapse of state socialism, the potentially harmful inﬂ uence of unre-
constructed communist-era bureaucracies was recognised in general terms. But 
reform of the state was widely seen as a second-order issue, largely reducible 
to the rolling back of old institutions, which would more or less automatically 
ﬂ ow from the wider success of liberal economic and political reforms. Two new 
studies, Conor O‘Dwyer‘s Runaway State-building (henceforth RSB) and Anna 
Grzymała-Busse‘s Rebuilding Leviathan (henceforth RL), argue that in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) reform of the state has been a far more protracted, com-
plex and uneven process than might have been expected given the region’s suc-
cess in democratisation and marketisation compared to other post-communist 
and transitional states. Indeed, although employment levels and spending in the 
public sector in CEE have often declined since 1989, the personnel and expendi-
ture of central government bureaucracies across the region have expanded, often 
at alarming rates, with little real gain in efﬁ ciency or capacity – a phenomenon 
O‘Dwyer graphically terms ‘runaway state-building’.
This essay surveys the crosscutting and overlapping arguments of the two 
books, including their conceptualisation of the problems of state politicisation, 
deﬁ nitions and measurement of the state administration and its effectiveness, con-
cepts of ‘robust competition’ and empirical ﬁ ndings. It argues that while the two 
books signiﬁ cantly advance knowledge on state transformation and party-state 
relationships in democratising states, their sometimes contradictory ﬁ ndings and 
heavy reliance on ‘robust competition’ as an explanatory variable suggest that there 
is considerable scope for the reﬁ nement of comparative research in this area. 
‘Runaway state-building’ versus ‘opportunistic state reconstruction’
Both books under review adopt essentially ‘small N’ comparative strategies using 
a mix of quantitative and qualitative techniques. O‘Dwyer focuses on the experi-
ence of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia between 1990 and (approximate-
* Direct all correspondence to: Seán Hanley, School of Slavonic and East European Stud-
ies, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom, 
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ly) 2002 before testing his argument against the experience of new democracies 
across post-communist Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Grzymała-Busse 
undertakes a nine-country comparison of CEE states from 1990 to 2004, which 
takes in O’Dwyer’s three cases, as well as Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia and the 
Baltic states. 
O’Dwyer sees the experience of post-communist CEE as an episode of pa-
tronage-based state development, akin to that of Southern Europe, Latin America 
or US urban politics of the early-mid 20th century and the contemporary politics 
of many developing countries (RSB: 3–4, 7, 171–191). Shefter [1994] argued that 
the ability of parties to pursue patronage-based strategies depended upon the 
relative timing of the democratisation and bureaucratisation of the state. Where, 
as in Italy, the advent of mass democracy preceded the formation of a modern state 
apparatus, incumbent parties were able to use posts in the state administration as 
a patronage resource. When, as in the British or German cases, a professionalised 
state apparatus with norms of bureaucratic independence emerged before mass 
democracy, the state administration was unavailable as a partisan resource. At a 
structural level, O’Dwyer argues, post-1989 CEE democracies are similarly pre-
disposed to patronage politics because of their demobilised, atomised societies 
and delegitimised states, and because democratisation in 1989 came before the 
establishment of an autonomous, politically neutral state administration (RSB: 
19–23). Drawing on Shefter’s classic deﬁ nition of patronage as the allocation of 
divisible beneﬁ ts to voters, supporters and members by parties in exchange for 
political support (RSB: 221) [Shefter 1994: 221 n. 3], he hypothesises that the key 
patronage resource exchanged in the post-1989 CEE context are positions in the 
state administration (RSB: 221 n. 4), which were relatively well paid in relation to 
other public sector employment. 
Analogies with historic cases of democratic patronage politics are, however, 
not straightforward. As Grzymała-Busse notes, the weakness of post-commu-
nist civil society and the marked disinclination of Central and East Europeans to 
join membership organisations of any kind effectively ruled out the creation of 
mass organisations and extended client-patron networks characteristic of party 
clientelism in Southern Europe or Latin America. Moreover, the organisationally 
weak parties and volatile electorates of post-1989 CEE blocked other key elements 
of the traditional mass clientelist model such as high levels of elite collusion and 
party system cartelisation (RL: 186–187). The politicisation of the appointments 
of state ofﬁ cials and their subsequent decision-making in post-1989 CEE, she ar-
gues, seem to be less the classic clientelistic ‘exchange’ suggested by O’Dwyer, 
than parties’ straightforward securing of political control over state resources. The 
relationship between parties and the state in the region, Grzymała-Busse argues, 
must therefore be described in new conceptual terms as one of ‘opportunistic 
state reconstruction’ (RL: 3) or ‘state exploitation’. 
As evidenced by the oft-quoted remark of Solidarity Election Action leader 
Marian Krzaklewski during Poland’s 1997 election campaign that he would ﬁ nd 
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jobs in the state administration for four thousand party supporters (RSB: 65), 
many CEE parties certainly had strong inclinations towards classic patronage 
strategies. Grzymała-Busse accepts that the practices of some dominant parties 
such as Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and niche 
groupings such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) approximated classic patronage 
politics (RL: 151). Grzymała-Busse also makes a further signiﬁ cant distinction. 
Partisan exploitation of the state in post-communist CEE, she stresses, is a facet of 
post-communist transformation, which feeds off and distorts the politics of lib-
eral reform. Central to her conception, therefore, is the way in which incumbent 
parties manipulate or delay the creation of a neutral, professional state adminis-
tration and related oversight institutions, while remaining outwardly committed 
to liberal norms of public administration (RL: 40–42)
Measuring the size and effectiveness of the state administration
Both authors seek to measure both the size and effectiveness of the state admin-
istration in CEE states. They deﬁ ne state administration in very similar terms 
as the administrative bureaucracy of central government and the agencies di-
rected by it.1 Both thus exclude wider employment in the public sector, where, 
they believe, stricter requirements for professional qualiﬁ cations made politi-
cised discretionary hiring by parties more difﬁ cult, and where lower salary levels 
made posts less attractive to potential political appointees. Also excluded are the 
administrations of autonomous elected local and regional governments, whose 
varying structures and competences make systematic cross-national compari-
son problematic (RL: 233; RSB: 14–15). Size is measured by both authors mainly 
in terms of employment and expenditure. O‘Dywer works with data obtained 
from national statistical ofﬁ ces, which he re works for maximum comparability. 
Grzymała-Busse presents a range of statistical data from a variety of national 
and international sources, but mainly focuses on labour force surveys carried out 
using standardised EU categories. She also tracks the growth of extra budgetary 
funds and parastatal agencies, which she sees as a particularly signiﬁ cant indica-
tor of politicised administrative expansion (RL: 159–166). 
Effectiveness proves a more difﬁ cult concept to operationalise. Grzymała-
Busse assesses it by tracking the development of independent formal institutions 
of oversight and monitoring likely to constrain corrupt and partisan exploita-
1 Grzymała-Busse deﬁ nes state administration as the ‘central and territorial ofﬁ ces of the 
national state: employees of the ministries, regulatory and ﬁ scal agencies, social security 
and labor ofﬁ ce administration and their territorial branches’ (RL: 233), O’Dwyer deﬁ nes 
it as the ‘set of positions most directly linked to the policies of national government’ (RSB: 
13). He also introduces an additional concept, ‘national-level state administration’ (RSB: 
207). However, as deﬁ ned, this too seems to overlap quite closely with the concept of ‘state 
administration’ used by Grzymała-Busse.
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tion of the state, such as ombudsmen, national auditing ofﬁ ces, securities and 
exchange commissions, and legislation deﬁ ning and protecting the status, job 
security and career structure of civil servants (RL: 25–28). Even when weak and 
unembedded, she argues, such new oversight institutions and laws exercise a 
constraining or deterrent effect on party abuse of the state (RL: 151–154). She also 
undertakes public opinion surveys in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria and 
Poland, seeking to assess state effectiveness by gauging the (perceived) impor-
tance of party political inﬂ uence in the eyes of the public in the hiring of staff and 
making administrative decisions on everyday matters, such as the granting of 
building permits (RL: 144, 242–246). 
O’Dwyer, by contrast, sees conﬁ gurations of formal institutions and party 
funding regimes as broadly similar across his three cases. Moreover, he claims, 
even when established more quickly or more extensively, formal oversight insti-
tutions are sufﬁ ciently unproven and subject to political manipulation as to be 
a poor indicator of effective governance and administration (RSB: 17). Instead, 
he tracks state effectiveness, through the development (or absence) of Weberian 
norms in both existing and new state institutions, speciﬁ cally: the predictability 
of civil servants’ career paths; the development of an ethic of professionalism; the 
emergence of clearly understood (and consistently enforced) boundaries between 
public and private interests; and the bureaucratic autonomy and independence 
from party political inﬂ uence of ofﬁ cials (RSB: 5). He seeks to access these proc-
esses by conducting semi-structured interviews with state administrators in his 
three case study countries, asking how secure they feel from party political pres-
sure, and soliciting their views about the size, effectiveness, levels of professional-
ism and nature of career paths in their respective state administrations. In addi-
tion, O‘Dwyer triangulates by carrying out parallel interviews with politicians, 
NGO activists and journalists. However, the statistically small numbers of ofﬁ cials 
(52 respondents in the Czech Republic, 43 in Slovakia, 70 in Poland) and the snow-
balling technique O’Dwyer uses to make contact with interviewees undermines 
the presentation of his ﬁ ndings as survey data enabling generalisations about the 
different national state administrations (RSB: 82–83). The very broad anonymity 
that he grants interviewees, which in most cases even extends to the institutions 
they work in, also makes it more difﬁ cult to gauge how widespread the trends he 
highlights are.2 The battery of direct questions he uses also lacks the sophistica-
tion of Grzymała-Busse’s survey, which deploys hypothetical ‘vignettes’ to probe 
beyond initial unreﬂ ected or self-serving responses by interview subjects.
Both authors additionally discuss policy areas which they see as particular-
ly signiﬁ cant or indicative for the study of partisan abuse of the state. Grzymała-
Busse examines party funding regimes and privatisation processes, both of which 
2 O’Dwyer does, however, give a breakdown of interviewees into general categories (elect-
ed/appointed, central/regional/local government) (RSB: 215) and includes one brief case 
study of speciﬁ c institutions, which discusses recruitment and stafﬁ ng patterns of foreign 
ministries (RSB: 93–97).
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she sees as potentially facilitating state exploitation. Public funding of parties is 
an obvious means for political parties, including the incumbent parties central 
to Grzymała-Busse’s concept of ‘state exploitation’, to obtain resources from the 
state. Lax or poorly enforced regulatory regimes in turn offer an important con-
duit for both overtly corrupt payments and improper (if sometimes legal) dona-
tions to incumbents from state-owned companies, which are notionally private 
entities. Privatisation, she suggests, can create an ‘informal funding regime’ of-
fering a rich source of kickbacks for incumbent parties (RL: 201–221). O’Dwyer 
seeks to examine the operation of patronage-driven ‘runaway state-building’ in 
the transformation of communist welfare states, focusing on health and pension 
reforms (RSB: 141–169). The gap between universal welfare, health and pension 
entitlements and those actually received by the public, he suggests, can be seen as 
an additional indicator of state performance. The elimination of communist-era 
practices of health and welfare professionals receiving informal payments from 
the public, he thinks, is a particularly important subsidiary indicator of such 
‘phoney universalism’ and hence of state (in)effectiveness. 
Divergent ﬁ ndings
Both authors ﬁ nd that numbers of state administrators have generally increased 
across CEE since the collapse of communism, both absolutely and relative to oth-
er parts of the public sector. However, O‘Dwyer’s estimates of personnel numbers 
are consistently and considerably lower than Grzymała-Busse’s preferred meas-
ure. Employment levels in CEE state administrations given in the other sources 
cited by Grzymała-Busse also vary markedly. For example, while O‘Dwyer’s cal-
culations indicate that that the Czech state administration employed 38 667 peo-
ple in 1993, the sectoral labour force survey favoured by Grzymała-Busse gives a 
ﬁ gure of 132 700 (RSB: 209; RL: 239). As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, even where and 
when the two books‘ case selections and timescales do overlap, it is still difﬁ cult, 
to say the least, to ﬁ nd common trends in the patterns of growth.
Overall RL and RSB do agree broadly as to where and when ‘runaway’ 
growth has occurred. Both authors ﬁ nd that Slovakia experienced comparatively 
high levels of ineffective state growth. Citing World Bank governance indicators, 
O‘Dwyer also agrees with Grzymała-Busse that apparatuses in Hungary, Estonia 
and Slovenia underwent little administrative bloating, while Latvia and Bulgaria, 
like Slovakia, had highly exploited and over-expanded states. RL and RSB also 
both judge Poland to be an intermediate case.3 However, the two authors differ 
sharply in their assessment of the Czech Republic. For Grzymała-Busse the Czech 
3 Grzymała-Busse dichotomises her ﬁ ndings into a high growth, high exploitation clus-
ter of states and a low growth, low exploitation clusters, classifying Poland as one of the 
better performing low growth states. O‘Dwyer ranks Poland second of his three cases of 
‘runaway state-building’.
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state ranks ﬁ rmly with Slovakia and Latvia in the cluster of highly exploited states 
(RL: 4–5), while for O‘Dwyer it has the lowest levels of ‘runaway state-building’. 
Grzymała-Busse ﬁ nds that over the period 1990–2004 employment in the Czech 
state administration more than doubled and that, at 5.7%, the average annual 
growth rate in the number of employees in the Czech state administration was 
among the highest in the region. Moreover, key countervailing and monitoring 
institutions in the Czech Republic such as regional government, a national au-
dit ofﬁ ce, an ombudsman or a securities and exchange commission were set up 
belatedly or in emasculated form. Indeed, in some instances, such as that of the 
Czech Supreme Audit Ofﬁ ce, the independence and power of existing oversight 
institutions was reduced.
O’Dwyer, by contrast, using a different timeframe, calculates a mere 16% 
increase in the number of employees in the Czech state administration between 
1993 and 2000, while for Poland and Slovakia over the same period he ﬁ nds in-
creases of 55% and 71% respectively (see Figure 1). He also ﬁ nds that Czech state 
ofﬁ cials report little party political interference and are developing a growing 
ethos of professionalism and bureaucratic independence, although he stresses 
Figure 1. Cumulative growth in state administration employment 1993–2000 (O‘Dwyer)
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Seán Hanley: Re-stating Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe?
1161
that such bureaucratisation should be seen as a process, not a consolidated out-
come or inevitable trend. In his two higher growth cases, Polish and Slovak inter-
viewees detect no such trends. In Slovakia civil service careers are bounded by 
‘purge mechanisms’, with ofﬁ cials supportive or opposed to Vladimír Mečiar’s 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) departing en masse as the party’s 
fortunes waxed and waned. In Poland, he ﬁ nds a more confused situation: the 
Polish state administration is politicised, unprofessional and unstable because of-
ﬁ cials appointed by different parties at different times co-exist awkwardly. Many 
Polish ofﬁ cials also try to hedge their bets by establishing contacts across several 
party networks. 
Explaining ineffective state growth 
Both authors then seek to explain the politicised and inefﬁ cient growth in CEE 
state administrations. Their initial reasoning largely coincides. They agree that, to 
some extent, the increased inefﬁ ciency is explicable by the new demands placed 
on the state for new forms of regulation and administration generated by more 
Figure 2.  Cumulative growth in state administration employment 1993–2000 
(Grzymała-Busse)
Source: Calculated from data in Rebuilding Leviathan, 237–241.
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
%
 g
ro
w
th
 o
n 
19
93
 Czech Republic Poland Slovakia
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Year
1993 1994 200019991998199719961995
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1162
complex, pluralistic market societies. However, they conclude that, given the simi-
lar social changes across CEE, growth in the state administration is simply too var-
iable to be explained in purely functional or historical terms. Such variation, both 
writers agree, cannot be explained by the provision of additional public goods, 
given an obvious mismatch with rates of economic growth (RL: 44–45). Nor can 
it be explained as a by-product of state-building in newly independent nations 
such as Slovakia or the Baltic states. As Grzymała-Busse notes, between 1990 and 
2004 the number of employees in Estonia‘s state administration grew little, while 
in neighbouring Latvia the number of state administrators more than quadrupled 
(RL: 4). Moreover, in Slovakia the number of employees in the state administration 
grew more rapidly not in the immediate aftermath of independence in 1993, but 
in the mid-1990s, at a time of intense political conﬂ ict between the government 
of Vladimir Mečiar and its political opponents (RL: 45) Although the pattern of 
democratisation preceding state reform found in CEE conﬁ rms Shefter‘s classic 
insight, as both authors rightly note, it does little to explain the pronounced pat-
terns of national variation in the growth and effectiveness of state administration.
Legacies and the role of the EU
As Grzymała-Busse observes, state reconstruction in transitional societies is a 
process of ‘bricolage’ involving renovating and reconﬁ guring existing institu-
tions as much as designing new institutions from scratch. However, although she 
notes the more technocratic composition of state administrators in more liberal 
communist regimes of ‘national accommodation’ such as Hungary and Poland, 
she dismisses communist regime legacies as an inﬂ uence on state exploitation, 
arguing that while rates of elite turnover in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Po-
land were similar, levels of partisan state exploitation varied (RL: 46). She there-
fore concludes that in this case ‘[h]istorical legacies of state development mat-
tered less than the immediate competitive context’ (RL: 21). O’Dwyer explores the 
possible role of historically national administrative traditions more thoroughly. 
Kitschelt’s notion of Czech communism as a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ regime 
drawing on a pre-communist modernity and Austrian bureaucratic traditions 
[Kitschelt 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999], he accepts, does prima facie offer an alterna-
tive explanation for the superior performance of the Czech state administration. 
However, he reasons that if national administrative culture exercised greater in-
ﬂ uence than party competition, we would expect to ﬁ nd constrained growth in 
the Czech state administration at the local as well as the national level, despite the 
different institutional structures and the weakness of party organisation in Czech 
local politics. However, he ﬁ nds ‘runaway’ growth levels in personnel numbers 
in Czech local administration. Like Grzymała-Busse, he therefore rules out any 
causal impact of distinct national political-cultural legacies.
Both authors also downplay inﬂ uences from the European Union. O’Dwyer 
draws on work on regionalisation in CEE accession states to argue that the tough-
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ness and tightness of EU conditionalities were exaggerated, and in practice CEE 
political elites were easily able to instrumentalise and exploit the Union’s vaguely 
framed requirements. Grzymała-Busse adopts a similar line of argument, but al-
lows that the EU did exercise some leverage over ‘laggard’ states, prompting them 
belatedly to create a host of formal oversight institutions in the period 2002–2004 
(RL: 86–91). Indeed, in her case study analysis she suggests that ‘EU pressure’ 
was the key reason why the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Latvia cre-
ated any such institutions at all (RL: 104, 130, 157–158, 163).
Party competition and state reform
Having eliminated alternative explanations, both authors then argue that the 
key explanatory factor is to be found in patterns of party competition. Both 
Grzymała-Busse and O’Dwyer argue that ‘robust competition’ can check structur-
ally embedded tendencies towards partisan exploitation of the state (RL: 14–15). 
However, each understands ‘robust competition’ and its effects differently. For 
Grzymała-Busse its deﬁ ning feature is a distinct, clearly identiﬁ able opposition 
party or bloc that continuously and effectively criticises governing parties, rather 
than colluding or allowing itself to be co-opted, and thus represents a plausible 
alternative government. She rejects conventional measures of party competition 
such as party system openness, fragmentation, party turnover, electoral volatility 
or ideological polarisation. Such conventional measures, she argues, do not indi-
cate whether incumbent parties faced a credible threat of replacement and may 
simply highlight the rise of uncoalitionable extreme groups or protest parties 
(RL: 51–58). Instead, Grzymała-Busse presents her own tripartite index of robust 
party competition based on: 1) the extent of regeneration of the former ruling 
communist party into a moderate centre-left bloc; 2) the average number of criti-
cal parliamentary questions asked by opposition deputies; and 3) the average seat 
share of plausible parties in a national parliament since 1989 (RL: 14). The nature 
of such ‘plausibility’ is left somewhat vague, but seems essentially to consist in 
programmatic coherency, moderation, and elite competence in the eyes of both 
voters and potential coalition partners.
Grzymała-Busse’s polling conﬁ rms signiﬁ cant, but varying, levels of cor-
ruption by ofﬁ cials. However, with the partial exception of Slovakia, there is little 
evidence of traditional mass party patronage extending to the lower levels of 
the state administration. However, comparing clusters of state exploitation and 
patterns of party competition, she ﬁ nds that, while conventional indices of party 
system competitiveness have little explanatory power,4 there is a close correlation 
between robust party competition, as she conceptualizes it, and levels of parti-
4 Grzymała-Busse allows that some composite indices such as O‘Dwyer‘s may co-vary 
with state exploitation, but objects that authors using them do not provide a clear account 
of how inter-party competition constrains state exploitation (RL: 57).
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san abuse of the state (RL: 50–57). In Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
Latvia, where for long periods dominant parties of left, right or centre faced no 
effective opposition, there were higher levels of state exploitation. In all cases, she 
believes, the lack of robust early party competition was rooted in the weakness 
of the anti-communist opposition or the failure of communist successor parties 
to regenerate themselves promptly into a credible moderate centre-left bloc. The 
reverse, she ﬁ nds, was true in Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, and, to a 
more limited extent, Poland.
O’Dwyer agrees that to prevent runaway state-building ‘the only effective 
constraint is a credible opposition party or parties, which voters can use to punish 
parties that push patronage too far’ (RSB: 13). However, O’Dwyer’s conception of 
robust party competition stresses an important precondition largely missing (or 
at best implicit) in Grzymała-Busse’s account: that robustly competing parties 
need not only be critical and credible, but must also be institutionalised, in order 
to offer voters a meaningful choice based on a ‘manageable number of stable par-
ties with familiar coalition-building preferences’ (RSB: 7). Drawing implicitly on 
a long-running debate in US political science about the optimum forms of party 
competition and party-society linkage, which dates back to the seminal APSA 
report of 1950 [David 1992; Pierce 1999]; Epstein 2000], he terms this a ‘respon-
sible’ party system and deﬁ nes it in terms of low levels of fractionalisation and 
electoral volatility, limited party turnover, a relatively high degree of ‘closure’ to 
new entrants, and in most cases bi-polar competition (RSB: 27–28).
Of his three case study countries, only the Czech Republic, he judges, has 
a responsible party system. Party systems with generalised party fragmentation, 
high party turnover and high electoral volatility, such as that of Poland, he argues, 
represent a ‘weak governance model’, with little vertical accountability of parties 
to voters, high levels of party patronage and signiﬁ cant ‘runaway state-building’. 
In weak governance models, O’Dwyer argues, the use of the state administration 
for patronage is the necessary glue for binding unstable, ideologically unwieldy 
coalitions and is politically less costly for parties in confused unstable systems 
as the lines of voter-party accountability become blurred. The inability of weak 
unstable governing parties to take full control of the state apparatus and to purge 
their predecessors’ appointees in such systems also leads them to sponsor the 
creation of new state agencies, exacerbating tendencies towards ‘runaway state-
building’ (RSB: 25–26).
Finally, O’Dwyer notes the existence of a ‘dominant party system’ model, 
exempliﬁ ed by the case of Slovakia, wherein a powerful, well institutionalised 
incumbent party, such as Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS), or elsewhere Franjo Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), faces 
a fragmented unstable, ideologically diverse opposition, which has difﬁ culty of-
fering a united or coherent alternative to voters (RSB: 26–27). The consequence of 
this, argues O’Dwyer, is the relentless politicisation of appointments in the state 
administration in favour of the ruling party. When such dominant parties are 
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toppled in elections by opposition coalitions, O’Dwyer suggests, a second vari-
ant of the dominant party model ensues: disparate and divided new governing 
coalitions struggle either to turn the ‘purge mechanism’ against well entrenched 
supporters of the dominant party in the state administration or to introduce re-
forms constraining partisan abuse of the state. The result is a deadlocked situa-
tion which preserves the status quo of a politicised, ineffective and oversized state 
administration. The relationship between the four variants of party competition 
he identiﬁ es and the levels of ‘runaway state-building’ is also conﬁ rmed by his 
regression analyses testing his hypotheses against a larger pool of some ﬁ fty new 
democracies in post-communist Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia (RSB: 
170–191). The extent to which welfare and health entitlements go unmet and in-
formal practices persist, O’Dwyer ﬁ nds, matches the patterns of ‘runaway state-
building’ he identiﬁ es in state administration and, he believes, are explicable in 
the same terms as a consequence of different patterns of party competition. 
How does robust competition inhibit partisan abuse of the state? In both ac-
counts ‘robust competition’ is seen as having a constraining effect because it ena-
bles effective monitoring of incumbents by opposition parties. However, beyond 
this, the two authors see robust party competition as working through different 
mechanisms. For Grzymała-Busse the key constraining mechanism inhibiting 
party abuse of the state is the anticipation of electoral defeat by incumbents. Fear 
of ultimate electoral defeat, she argues, leads them to the pre-emptive establish-
ment of institutions of monitoring oversight and control. Such institutions are 
a self-interested insurance policy by incumbents to ensure that, when defeated, 
they are not permanently excluded from the political game by opponents able to 
mobilise state assets against them (RL: 15–17). For O’Dwyer, whose concept of 
state effectiveness stresses Weberian bureaucratisation within institutions rather 
than the development of new ones, robust competition leads to the absence of 
major party-inspired institution building. In his view, where new institutions 
are created because of pressures exerted by party competition, their formation is 
usually a politicised process leading to the foundation of ﬂ abby and inefﬁ cient 
structures. 
Conceptual advances and methodological challenges
Runaway State-building and Rebuilding Leviathan are outstanding pieces of com-
parative analysis, which, taken together, succeed in establishing plausible links 
between patterns of party competition and the development of post-commu-
nist state administration, and each makes important conceptual contributions. 
Grzymała-Busse is innovative in rethinking ‘state exploitation’ as a category dis-
tinct from traditional patronage, while O’Dwyer offers theoretically richer ac-
counts of sub-optimal types of party competition and the relationship of state 
ofﬁ cials and parties. Despite some divergence in methods and ﬁ ndings, their 
overlapping assessments do enable us to identify two clear sub-groups of CEE 
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states, one where post-communist state administration has emerged as relatively 
effective and unpoliticised (Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia), and another where the 
outcome is clearly the reverse (Slovakia, Latvia). The two books’ sometimes di-
verging judgments also highlight important unresolved issues concerning the 
operationalisation and measurement of the size and effectiveness of the state ad-
ministration in CEE, forms of ‘robust competition’, and the nature of party politi-
cal encroachment on the state. 
The authors’ divergent assessments of the evolving size of CEE state ad-
ministrations raise important issues about the extent to which current levels of 
state performance can be regarded as consolidated (or consolidating) outcomes. 
Both authors identify leaders and laggards in CEE by comparing the state on the 
eve of EU accession with the situation in 1989–1990. But such snapshots can be 
misleading. If we measure outcomes at different time points – or across differ-
ent time periods – rankings can appear quite different. For example, recalculat-
ing Grzymała-Busse’s ﬁ gures of growth in state administrative employment for 
the pre-accession period of 1990–1998 – when domestic party competition should 
have played a more clear-cut role, given the absence of explicit EU conditionalities 
– we ﬁ nd a much less clear-cut pattern of clustering into high and low exploitation 
cases. Hungary and Estonia are again conﬁ rmed as having low levels of growth in 
the size of the state administration, while Latvia again appears as a laggard with 
numbers tripling. All other states, however, including Bulgaria, appear as essen-
tially intermediate cases with growth in the range of 50–90%. Indeed, measured 
across the 1990–1998 period, Bulgaria ranks as an intermediate case with growth 
in state administrative employment only slightly below that of Poland. None of 
this necessarily invalidates Grzymała-Busse’s argument. One can credibly argue 
that there was an ongoing process of differentiation among CEE state administra-
tions. However, this perhaps suggests that comparative state development in the 
region is a more dynamic, ﬂ uid and ambiguous process than either book allows. 
A related methodological issue is that of the baseline against which the state 
development and the unfolding party-state relationships of CEE should be meas-
ured. Grzymała-Busse’s labour force survey data allow her to use 1990 as a base-
line, while O’Dwyer, who was unable to obtain satisfactory separate data for the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic before the break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
uses 1993 as a starting point. Although they do not fully explain them, such dif-
ferent baselines have signiﬁ cant consequences for both the comparative levels of 
state expansion found and the explanations that might plausibly account for it. 
For example, much of the expansion – and the high mean annual growth rate in 
– the Czech and Slovak state administrations detected by Grzymała-Busse over 
the 1990–2004 period can actually be explained by a spike in employment that 
occurred in 1991–1992. Over these two years, Grzymała-Busse’s ﬁ gures record, 
there was an increase of 24% in the number of employees in the state administra-
tion in the Czech Republic and of no less than 48% in the Slovak Republic, from 
56 531 to 83 767 – a gain of 27 236 employees, which represents the bulk of the 
overall increase in the period 1990–2004. After 1993, as Figure 1 illustrates, ac-
Seán Hanley: Re-stating Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe?
1167
cording to Grzymała-Busse’s ﬁ gures, the year-on-year increases for Slovakia were 
relatively modest, although, consistent with her analysis, the growth rates in the 
size of the state administration in the Czech Republic were quite high in the early 
years of the Klaus government.
It is unclear whether the 1991–1992 spike that Grzymała-Busse records 
reﬂ ected a genuine expansion in employment, administrative re-organisation 
connected with the re-structuring of the federal Czechoslovak state, or merely a 
change in statistical methodology. If it is more than a statistical artefact, it is also 
unclear whether such growth can be explained by the accounts of party competi-
tion that Grzymała-Busse provides, given the ﬂ uid and emergent state of both 
the Czech and Slovak party systems in 1991–1992. Although such questions may 
be answerable within a party system perspective of the kind that both authors 
favour, these unresolved measurement-related issues undermine their compara-
tive ﬁ ndings and give them a somewhat provisional feel.
The books’ other divergent ﬁ ndings regarding party competition can sim-
ply be explained by the different yardsticks the two authors use, allowing their 
arguments to some extent to be synthesised. There is, in principle, no reason 
to suppose that the growing trend towards bureaucratic professionalism that 
O’Dwyer ﬁ nds in the Czech state administration cannot co-exist with Grzymała-
Busse’s ﬁ nding that the Czech state lacks effective or extensive oversight institu-
tions. When combined, these ﬁ ndings raise the intriguing prospects that formal 
oversight institutions may not be the only route to state effectiveness or, more 
worryingly, that increasingly professionalised state administrations can work in 
symbiosis with party political abuse of the state.
Similarly, Czech party competition can be viewed as robust in O’Dwyer’s 
sense, in that it has relatively stable, well institutionalised, programmatic parties, 
but as lacking robustness in Grzymała-Busse’s meaning, because its mechanisms 
for alternating between left and right are inadequate owing to the presence of a 
strong anti-system party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). 
At bottom, for Grzymała-Busse ‘robust competition’ is a mechanism of horizon-
tal accountability, in which parties keep each other in check, while for O‘Dwyer 
party systems are more a classic channel of vertical accountability, allowing voters 
to punish unsuccessful or miscreant politicians. There is no reason to suppose 
that vertical and horizontal mechanisms of constraint could not operate simulta-
neously, suggesting that the Czech party system is perhaps more intermediate in 
its effects than either author allows. 
Visegrád and beyond
A further criticism that can be levelled is the books’ overdependence on the ex-
perience of the four Central European Visegrád states (V4) to derive key analyti-
cal propositions. Grzymała-Busse defends this approach on the grounds that the 
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Baltic states, Slovenia and Bulgaria are ‘difﬁ cult cases where standard measures 
of party competition would lead us to expect opposite outcomes’ (RL: 24). Leaving 
aside pragmatic considerations, such as the availability of secondary literature or 
the Central and Eastern European languages most commonly spoken by Western 
researchers, there seems no strong reason to consider such cases more complex 
than the V4. Indeed, methodologically, it might be equally valid to develop an 
analysis based on Baltic or South East European cases and test it on the Visegrád 
states. In general terms, the non-V4 cases bear out Grzymała-Busse’s broad argu-
ments. However, they also point to a need to reﬁ ne or qualify her model. Slove-
nia’s low levels of state exploitation and well structured competitive party system, 
for example, conﬁ rm the importance of the early social democratisation of com-
munist successor parties for the establishment of robust party competition. How-
ever, the long-time lack of alternation in the Slovenian party system suggests that 
O’Dwyer’s notion of robust competition as expressed in institutionalised divisions 
between programmatic parties may be a more valid perspective on Slovenia. 
Estonia ranks second only to Hungary in minimising the ineffective politi-
cised growth of the state administration. However, its party system lacked any 
clear left-right demarcation based on the regime-opposition divide, had no sig-
niﬁ cant communist successor party, reformed or otherwise, and until 1996 had 
no state funding for parties, suggesting that, as in the Latvian case, ‘informal 
funding regimes’ should have burgeoned. Grzymała-Busse argues that Estonia 
avoided the Latvian experience because of its strict state regulation of political 
parties (RL: 192), because of the multiplicity of coalition combinations that its 
relatively fragmented party system afforded, especially given the weakness of 
the (potentially uncoalitionable) Russian minority parties, and because Edgar 
Savisaar’s social liberal Estonian Centre Party (EK), in opposition for most of 
the 1990s, played a role equivalent to that of reformed communist successor par-
ties elsewhere in CEE as ‘the most vehement critic of successive governments’ 
(RL: 72). Here Grzymała-Busse’s book provokes many questions that might en-
rich her account (RL: 192). What kind of party consolidation mechanisms substi-
tuted for the regime-opposition divide in Estonia? Did strong national minority 
parties in highly exploited states, such as Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria, affect the 
range of credible coalition alternatives? Was Estonia’s policy of building its own 
embryonic state institutions and state personnel de novo in the late 1980s in any 
way signiﬁ cant? 
O’Dwyer’s ambitious extension of his Visegrád-derived model to new de-
mocracies across Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America provides broad aggre-
gate support for his general propositions. However, it seems problematic in its 
coding and its assumption that a fourfold typology of party systems developed 
on the basis of three CEE cases can safely capture patterns of party competition 
across four continents without concept stretching. Indeed, even his codings of 
party systems within the wider post-communist region highlight some of the 
limitations of his typology. 
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Table 1. O’Dwyer’s categorisation of post-communist party systems
Party system type Electoral differential 
main governing 
party > 20% 
Electoral volatility Level of institution-
alisation
Dominant party system 
(variant 1)
Albania 1996–2002
Croatia 1996, 1998
Russia 2000, 2002
Slovakia 1996, 1998
Serbia 1996–2000
Yes – over two 
elections
Dominant party system 
(variant 2)
Croatia 2000, 2002
Russia 1996, 1998
Serbia 2002
Slovakia 2002, 2002
Ukraine 1996–2000
Yes – one election 
only
Weak governance system
Bulgaria 1996–2002
Estonia 1996, 1998
Latvia 1996–2002
Lithuania 1996–2002
Macedonia 1996–2002
Moldova 1996–2002
Romania 1996–2002
Slovenia 1996–2002
No\ High Low
Responsible party system
Czech Republic 1996–2000
Estonia 2000, 2002
Hungary 1996–2000
No Low High
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O’Dwyer categorises party systems in terms of a fourfold typology of party 
competition using a two-step procedure. First, he assesses the degree of dominance 
of the main incumbent party by measuring whether its electoral support exceeds 
that of its nearest rival by a margin of more than 20% over successive elections. 
Then, for party systems without any pattern of dominance, he examines levels of 
electoral volatility and the extent of party system institutionalisation using indices 
and expert judgments in the secondary literature to determine whether they fall in 
the ‘low governance’ or ‘responsible party’ category (RSB: 171–175). Each national 
party system is examined at four points, in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, allowing 
party system change to be captured. O’Dwyer’s operationalisation of his party 
system typology and categorisation of party systems are summarised in Table 1.
However, as O‘Dwyer is aware (RSB: 179), his categorisation of post-com-
munist party systems generates some obvious incongruities. The ‘weak govern-
ance‘ category groups a large and disparate group of states, ranging from Slovenia 
– one of the best performing nations for administrative effectiveness – to interme-
diate cases such as Poland, to countries with highly politicised, low quality state 
administrations like Bulgaria and Romania – and even post-Soviet states such as 
Moldova and Ukraine, considered by some analysts to be neo-patrimonial states 
on a par with contemporary Africa [van Zon 2001]. O’Dwyer does not provide 
precise details of his calculations or the indices used to measure party system 
institutionalisation, noting only that he does his own assessment of instutionali-
sation for East European cases using the criteria in the main text (RSB: 247 n. 8). 
He seems to dichotomise cases outside post-communist Europe into high and 
low institutionalisation systems using scorings from several secondary sources. 
However, this is not explicitly stated. The author only comments that the scales 
used in composite indices of institutionalisation in secondary sources vary, but 
that ‘the methodologies are broadly consistent’. It is also unclear where scores for 
electoral volatility are obtained or how these are calculated, although O’Dwyer 
does mention that some of the composite indexes of institutionalisation he drew 
on incorporated measurements of volatility (RSB: 173).
It is also unclear precisely why Slovenia’s party system has been catego-
rised as an under-institutionalised ‘weak governance’ system (RSB: 218–219). Al-
though more fragmented and multi-polar, it has many of the characteristics of 
the stable, programmatic ‘responsible party’ model developed on the basis of the 
Czech experience [Hloušek 2001]. A possible over-reliance on fragmentation and 
conventional measures of volatility, which fail to distinguish shifts in support 
between established parties from more fundamental changes in party system for-
mat, may have led to an incongruous categorisation here. Similarly, the dynamics 
of Romanian (and to some extent Bulgarian) party politics appear to have more 
in common with the second variant of the ‘dominant party’ model.5 Despite their 
5 The categorisation of Russia as a ‘dominant party’ system on the grounds that the Presi-
dency is, in effect, a surrogate party also stretches the concept, particularly as presidential-
ism is included as a control variable in regression models (RSB: 247 n. 10). 
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periodic electoral victories over the post-communist forces which had initially 
dominated early post-transition politics, liberal opposition blocs quickly faltered 
in government when faced with vested interests and internal tensions. 
Revising O’Dwyer’s categorisation along these lines tends, paradoxically, to 
conﬁ rm his argument about the relationship between types of party competition 
and the quality of the state administration. However, it also points to some of the 
conceptual shortcomings in his analysis and lends weight to Grzymała-Busse’s 
call for the formulation of new concepts of political competition better tailored to 
the realities of CEE and a more thorough thinking through of the nature of party 
‘dominance’ in the region (RL: 57 n. 102).
Both authors also tend to underestimate the complexity and dynamism of 
party systems even in the V4 states, often concertina-ing them into their respec-
tive typologies. Thus, O‘Dwyer‘s depiction of a robustly competitive Czech party 
system (RSB: 58–63) glosses over the period of dominance of the Civic Demo-
cratic Party (ODS) in the early-mid 1990s, when centre-left forces in the Czech 
Republic were as inchoate and divided as anywhere in CEE. Grzymała-Busse in 
turn downplays the effectiveness of the opposition of the resurgent Czech Social 
Democratic Party (ČSSD) after 1995, rather implausibly suggesting that Klaus‘s 
ODS still seemed ‘invincible’ after the 1996 parliamentary elections, when its vote 
remained static and the centre-right coalition it led lost its parliamentary major-
ity (RL: 212). Her comment regarding ČSSD that ‘until the late 1990s it had less 
than 6% of the vote’ (RL: 74) is also indicative. ČSSD polled 26.44% in the 1996 
parliamentary elections, not the ‘late 1990s’, and its vote in the 1992 Czech and 
Czechoslovak elections was, in fact, somewhat above 6%. Similarly, as Grzymała-
Busse hints (RL: 51, l02), O‘Dwyer‘s characterisation of the Polish party system as 
anarchic and lacking ideological coherence is overstated. Polish parties and party 
blocs have often proved short-lived and ﬁ ssiparous. However, ideological camps 
in Polish politics have shown greater continuity [Tworzecki 2003]. This weakens 
O’Dwyer’s interpretation of patronage as a substitute for ideological afﬁ nity.
Partisan abuse, privatisation and the welfare state 
Arguably, neither author is wholly successful in extending their argument be-
yond their main focus, the size and character of the central state bureaucracy. 
Grzymała-Busse ﬁ nds evidence of laxer party funding regulations in less com-
petitive systems, but there seems little support for her suggestions that incumbent 
parties used state funding to gain signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial advantage over parliamen-
tary opponents. The most signiﬁ cant effect of party funding regimes seems to 
have been to favour large parliamentary parties and weaken new and extra-par-
liamentary challengers, rather than shore up incumbents. It is also unclear how 
directly or reliably privatisation per se offered an illicit income stream for parties. 
Even in high exploitation cases such as the Czech Republic, illicit or concealed 
payments to parties seem often to have taken the looser form of interest groups 
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buying generalised political inﬂ uence and access [Myant 2003: 123; see also Reed 
1996]. The key objection Grzymała-Busse raises in relation to the applicability of 
traditional models of party clientelism in CEE – that classic clientelist exchange is 
unworkable in an unstable and unpredictable transitional environment – seems 
to apply a fortiori to party corruption in privatisation. As Martin Myant [2003: 
123] observes of the Czech case, the complexity of privatisation processes and 
the kaleidoscope of conﬂ icting individual, institutional and party interests made 
corrupt exchanges an uncertain proposition. Corruption in Czech privatisation, 
Myant concludes, was thus
…not a case of simple “cronyism” in which ﬁ rms are blatantly sold off to friends 
and allies of those in power. The process was less reliable, more secretive and more 
obscure, partly because with competing parties in a coalition government, there was 
not a single, controlling political elite. (…). A wise prospective buyer might have 
made donations to all the coalition partners and possibly the opposition parties 
too.
O’Dwyer’s extension of his ‘runaway state-building’ perspective to post-
communist welfare states in CEE is also problematic. Although certainly linked 
to broader administrative effectiveness, welfare state performance – and especial-
ly that of welfare states in transition – is arguably too complex to be reduced to a 
simple party system perspective. As O’Dwyer himself notes, many of the prob-
lems of Slovak and Polish health care in the 1990s stemmed from ﬁ scal problems, 
not party competition. Similarly, as Vanhuysse [2006] has argued, the buying off 
of potentially disruptive groups in Poland through generous early retirement 
schemes seems to reﬂ ect ‘strategic social policies’ and the key role of trade unions 
in both the main Polish centre-right and centre-left blocs, not the dynamics of a 
weak governance system. Very similar early retirement policies were followed in 
Hungary, a state which both authors see as having a relatively effective, compact 
state administration and a robustly competitive party system.
O’Dwyer’s characterisation of reform outcomes in health and welfare across 
his three cases also seems somewhat incomplete. Czech ‘success’ is predicated 
too much on the early introduction of notionally private health insurance funds, 
public opinion and levels of spending, while Poland’s early reform of its pen-
sion system is largely overlooked. Moreover, Slovakia has since leapfrogged both 
the Czech Republic and Poland by implementing radical reforms of the welfare, 
health-care and pension systems. Indeed, O’Dwyer’s own recent work argues that 
‘second stage’ neo-liberal reforms in Slovakia after 2002 were facilitated precisely 
by its weakly institutionalised, fragmented party system, which empowered pro-
market technocrats [O’Dwyer and Kovalčík 2007]. Why similar dynamics did not 
apply to welfare reform in fragmented CEE party systems during the 1990s is 
unclear.
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Communism, democracy and the state in contemporary CEE
 Like much work on the comparative politics of CEE after 1989, both studies rest 
upon broad-brush assumptions about the nature of communist rule, which are 
very largely substantiated using comparisons of the present, rather than his-
torical research. Such comparative strategies are not always wholly convincing. 
O’Dwyer’s national-local control comparison of party competition and growth 
in state administration, for example, arguably overlooks important aspects of the 
evolving relationship between the central and the local interests. Owing to de-
centralisation after 1989, growth in local state administration could be expected 
for purely functional reasons. In fact, the evidence presented suggests that it was 
localism not party patronage strategies that exerted the greatest pressure for frag-
mented and administratively irrational growth in local and government (RSB: 
117, 136–137). Highly centralised communist regimes had often deliberately dis-
regarded historic boundaries and local identities when ﬁ xing territorial-admin-
istrative units. After 1989 the legacies of such centralism, the weakness of grass-
roots party structures, and the overlapping nature of local elites [Vajdová 2003] 
often combined to create a strong form of localism which centred on demands 
for the break-up of communist-era units and the creation of new communes and 
municipalities. This resulted in an explosive growth in the number of communes 
and municipalities in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic.
Finer-grained, historically grounded studies examining the relationship of 
parties, bureaucrats and society further upset generalised assumptions about 
communism as a system of one party rule decaying into patronage and patri-
monialism. For instance, Horak’s recent [2007] study of urban governance in 
Prague suggests that administrators in some sectors such as transport already 
had a distinct ethos of professionalism and considerable stability and bureau-
cratic autonomy under state socialism and were, in consequence, highly resistant 
to political interventions both from the ruling Communist Party before 1989 and 
from democratic politicians after 1989. This undermines the conventional fram-
ing of the debate about the inﬂ uence of the communist past (found in both RL 
and RSB) as a question of distinguishing distinct national regime legacies from 
generic legacies of communism, suggesting that in some cases sectoral divisions 
between ministries and policy areas appear equally important. More signiﬁ cantly 
in the context of this essay, it also calls into question O’Dwyer’s stress on the 
development of classic bureaucratic structures as a path to democratic consolida-
tion. Horak’s work suggests that the problem after 1989 was not bureaucrats’ lack 
of Weberian professionalism but their hostility to public consultation and the 
participation of civil society organisations in policy-making.
O’Dwyer explicitly defends the need for the (re-)establishment of classic 
forms of hierarchical bureaucracy, rather than more networked forms of ‘new 
governance’, as a necessary ﬁ rst step for new post-transitional democracies. How-
ever, both authors shy away from any assessment of the future of the party-state 
and party-society relations in CEE or the wider debate about parties and the state 
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in contemporary democracies in Western Europe and North America and beyond 
[Mair, 1994; Kopecký and van Biezen 2007]. This is problematic. While the CEE of 
the 1990s can (and should) be studied as a democratising region, it seems increas-
ingly anachronistic to contrast the region to ‘the advanced, industrialised West’ 
(RSB: 205). In the context of an enlarged EU it seems unlikely that CEE states 
can or will develop along classic Weberian lines. Here, further exploration of the 
relationship of parties, state administration and the delivery of public services, 
preﬁ gured in O’Dwyer’s book, may prove especially revealing.
The broader question the two books implicitly raise is that of what kind of 
democracy CEE states could (and should) develop [Roberts 2006]. Like previous 
authors [Orenstein 2001]; Vachudova 2005], both Grzymała-Busse and O’Dwyer 
see adversarial two-party (or two-bloc) competition as a guarantee of reform and 
social progress, substituting for absence of strong civil societies and an effective 
rule of law. Indeed, O’Dwyer explicitly argues (RL: 203–205) that the instabil-
ity and weak democratic norms of the region’s parties make them untrustwor-
thy custodians of the state, rendering consensus-based or corporatist models of 
democracy inappropriate and even dangerous. Such a constrained view of the 
region’s democratic possibilities is characteristic of much literature of the reform 
politics of CEE.
The books’ stress on overcoming the communist past through the develop-
ment of a liberal state with checks and balances and a classic Weberian bureauc-
racy has also to some extent been overtaken by recent debates about the rise of 
illiberal populism in CEE. Both conclude their accounts on the eve of the EU 
accession in 2002–2004, largely missing the rise to ofﬁ ce of parties such as Po-
land’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) or Slovakia’s Direction Social Democracy party 
(Smer), as well as the increased inﬂ uence of more radical parties drawing on the 
anger and alienation of ‘transition losers’ [Krastev 2007]. The experiences of the 
Baltic states and Bulgaria also highlight the somewhat different phenomenon of 
‘centrist populism’ [Účeň 2007], exempliﬁ ed in the rise and fall of parties such as 
Estonia’s Res Publica or Bulgaria’s National Movement of Simeon II (NDSV). The 
latter parties‘ promises to govern more cleanly and reform more energetically ap-
peal to broader public appetites for ‘newness as a project’ [Sikk 2006], rather than 
the simple economic grievances of transition ‘losers’ If, as Ivan Krastev [2007] 
has suggested, we must increasingly accommodate such electoral insurgencies 
as part and parcel of the democratic process, we may need to think beyond a 
‘responsible party’ model centring on the bi-polar alternation in ofﬁ ce of well 
institutionalised, ‘plausible’ parties of left and the right.
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